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Abstract
A government agency delegates to a provider (hospital, medical
gatekeeper, school, social worker) the decision to supply a service or
treatment to individual recipients. The agency does not perfectly
know the distribution of individual treatment costs in the population.
The single-crossing property is not satisfied when the uncertainty per-
tains to the dispersion of the distribution. We find that the provision
of service should be distorted upwards when the first-best efficient
number of recipients is sufficiently high.
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1 Introduction
We consider an agency in charge of supplying a service or a treatment to a
population of potential recipients. Examples include medical procedures for
patients, after-school programs for low-income children, social care for the
disabled, or training programs for the unemployed. When the cost and the
benefit of the treatment vary across individuals, efficiency recommends to
supply the service only to those with a low enough cost benefit ratio. When
these variables are well observed by the agency, rationing by denial can be
used to implement the efficient policy.
In many instances, however, there remains substantial unobserved hetero-
geneity in cost and benefit conditional on observable variables. The agency
then may then observe the number of treated recipients, but not their individ-
ual characteristics. In this circumstance it can rely on rationing by selection,
i.e., leave the selection of recipients to the discretion of a better informed
service provider (Klein and Mayblin (2012)) and fund the system on the
basis of the number of treated recipients. However, because the provider’s
preferences are in general not perfectly aligned with those of the agency, the
population of selected recipients typically departs from the first-best efficient
recommendation. The literature generally assumes that the agency, when de-
signing the provider’s compensation scheme, perfectly knows the underlying
distribution of cost and benefit in the population of potential recipients. For
instance, the assumption is made in Makris and Siciliani (2013) and Malcom-
son (2005), with the former article investigating provider altruism and the
latter considering many treatment varieties –two issues not addressed here.
Perfect knowledge of the cost distribution is a strong assumption. Indeed,
because of data availability, only few studies have estimated the distribution
of individual treatment costs in specific contexts. It is obviously difficult
for researchers and agencies to obtain information about all the individual
characteristics that may affect treatment costs. One first difficulty comes
from a possible selection bias when only the characteristics of the treated
recipients are observed. Even assuming that a researcher observes all rele-
vant variables for a particular sample of recipients, econometric analysis only
provides agencies with statistical estimates whose precision depends, among
other things, on the size of the considered sample.
We argue in this article that the imperfect knowledge of the cost distri-
bution pertains to the dispersion as well as to the mean of that distribution.
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To make this point clear, it is useful to consider a typical model used by
econometricians to estimate heterogenous treatment costs. Following Dor-
mont and Milcent (2005), assume that the cost of treating recipient i by
provider j at time t is given by
Cijt = Xijtγ + uj + ηjt + εijt, (1)
where Xijt are exogenous variables, uj is a provider-specific effect that can
be assumed fixed or random, and ηjt and εijt are zero-mean disturbances.
Assume that the linear specification (1) is correct and that all variables that
influence cost are included. Suppose, furthermore, that the provider’s com-
pensation scheme is contingent on some of those variables, say Xcijt, but not
on others, say Xmijt, for instance because the latter variables are not observed
out of the sample used by the researcher. The assumption that the agency
perfectly knows the cost distribution is debatable when no precise estimate of
the parameters γ is available or when the distribution of the missing variables
is unknown –a situation likely to be frequent in practice. Furthermore, the
ignored variables Xmijt generate shifts in the mean as well as in the variance of
the cost distribution across providers, i.e., both the conditional expectation
E(Xmijtγ | j) and variance V(Xmijtγ | j) vary across providers.
In our framework, the agency, if it knew perfectly the cost distribution,
would be able to implement the first-best policy through a well-designed
compensation scheme, even though some relevant characteristics of potential
recipients are unobserved. Otherwise the uncertainty about the distribution
of heterogeneity causes the number of recipients to be distorted relative to
first-best efficiency. The direction of the distortion depends on whether the
uncertainty pertains to the mean or to the dispersion of individual treatment
costs. In the former case, we find that the usual Spence-Mirrlees condition is
satisfied and the distortion is necessarily downwards: The number of treated
recipients is lower than recommended by first-best efficiency. In the latter
case, the Spence-Mirrlees condition no longer holds. We find that the first-
best optimum then governs the sign of distortion in the second-best program:
The distortion is upwards when the first-best number of treated recipients
is sufficiently high. Uncertainty about the cost dispersion pushes towards
universal coverage policies.
3
2 Model
A population of individuals recipients, whose size is normalized to one, is el-
igible for a treatment supplied by a single provider. Individuals are indexed
by two nonnegative real numbers b and c that may be correlated. The treat-
ment of a type (b, c) recipient yields benefit b to the recipient and costs c to
the provider. The corresponding net social benefit is b− (1 + λ)c, where λ is
the (exogenously given) marginal cost of public funds.
Assumption 1. The (expected) net social benefit of treatment for a given
cost level c, E(b | c)− (1 + λ)c, is a non-increasing function of cost c with a
unique zero, denoted by c∗∗.
Assumption 1 holds true when the expected benefit decreases with cost,
a case often considered in the literature, e.g., in De Fraja (2000) and Makris
and Siciliani (2013). Malcomson (2005) provides health related examples
where this assumption is also relevant. Under this assumption, the first-best
requires to treat recipients with cost c ≤ c∗∗. Denoting by F the marginal
distribution of individual treatment costs in the population of recipients, the
first-best efficient number of treated recipients is n∗∗ = F (c∗∗).
In this paper, we assume that the agency relies on rationing by selection:
The agency observes the number n of recipients but not their individual
characteristics. The treatment decision is delegated to a single provider who
observes the individual characteristics of recipients. The agency offers a take-
or-leave-it contract specifying the number of recipients that must be treated
by the provider and a compensating transfer T . The utility of the provider
when she accepts the contract is U(n, T ) = T −C(n), where C(n) represents
the aggregate cost of treating n recipients.
Given (n, T ), utility maximization requires that the least costly recipients
be treated in priority. The provider’s cost of treating n recipients, 0 ≤ n ≤ 1,
is therefore given by
C(n) =
∫ F−1(n)
0
c dF (c).
The marginal cost is C ′(n) = F−1(n), i.e., the cost of the marginal treated
recipient is F−1(n), the nth-percentile of the distribution F . It follows that
the cost function C(n) is convex in n.
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The net social benefit of treating n recipients is given by S(n) = B(n)−
(1 + λ)C(n), where
B(n) =
∫ F−1(n)
0
E(b | c) dF (c)
represents the (expected) gross social benefit. Under Assumption 1, the net
social benefit function S(n) is concave in n, reaching its maximum at n∗∗ =
F (c∗∗). When the agency knows the distribution of individual recipients
characteristics, it can choose the number of treated recipients n and the
transfer T to the provider that maximize
B(n) + U(n, T )− (1 + λ)T = S(n)− λU(n, T )
subject to the provider’s participation constraint U(n, T ) ≥ 0. The solution
to this maximization problem is to set n = n∗∗ and U = U∗∗ = 0.
Under Assumption 1, the provider treats in priority the recipients with
highest expected social values: The social net benefit and the provider’s pri-
vate objective are aligned. Hence, the agency can achieve first-best efficient
solution if it knows the distribution of individual recipients characteristics.
From that distribution, the agency infers the number n∗∗ and the correspond-
ing cost, C(n∗∗). It is then sufficient to ask the provider to treat n∗∗ recipients
and reimburse C(n∗∗).
3 Unknown cost distribution
We now relax the assumption that the marginal distribution of individual
treatment costs, F , is perfectly known to the agency. We consider the sim-
plest form of uncertainty, whereby F takes two possible values, FH and FL
with associated probability piH and piL. Hence, the agency is faced with
one provider, itself confronted with a population of recipients within which
the marginal distribution of individual cost is either FH or FL. The actual
marginal cost distribution function is private information to the provider.
We refer to i ∈ {H,L} as the provider type. Provider i has cost function
Ci(n) with C
′
i(n) = F
−1
i (n).
Assuming that the distribution of benefit conditional on cost is the same
for both providers, we write the net social benefit of having n recipients
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treated by provider i as
Si(n) =
∫ F−1i (n)
0
[E(b|c)− (1 + λ)c ] dFi(c).
Assumption 1 is supposed to hold for the two provider types: The first-
best cost threshold for provider i is c∗∗ such that E(b|c∗∗) = (1 + λ)c∗∗. The
corresponding first-best efficient number of treated recipients is n∗∗i = Fi(c
∗∗).
Appealing to the revelation principle, we assume without loss of generality
that the agency offers a menu (ni, Ti), i = H,L, maximizing∑
i
pii [Si(ni)− λUi(ni, Ti)]
subject to the provider’s participation constraints Ui(ni, Ti) = Ti−Ci(ni) ≥ 0
and the incentive constraints Ui(ni, Ti) ≥ Ui(nj, Tj) for all i, j = H,L.
Suppose first that FL first-order stochastically dominates FH : FL(c) ≤
FH(c) for all c, with strict inequality on a non-degenerated interval. In this
case, the marginal cost functions are ordered, i.e.,
C ′H(n) = F
−1
H (n) < C
′
L(n) = F
−1
L (n), (2)
for all n. Given that CH(0) = CL(0), this implies that the cost functions
themselves are ordered in the same way, CH(n) < CL(n) for all n. The
first-best menu (n∗∗i , Ci(n
∗∗
i )) is not incentive compatible. However the usual
single-crossing condition is satisfied:
∂T
∂n
∣∣∣∣
UH
= C ′H(n) < C
′
L(n) =
∂T
∂n
∣∣∣∣
UL
,
for all n. This is the standard pattern in adverse selection problems. The
efficient provider can mimic the inefficient one and gets the informational
rent UH = CL(nL) − CH(nL). As piLSL − λpiH(CL − CH) decreases with
nL above n
∗∗
L , the number of patients treated by the inefficient provider is
distorted downwards relative to n∗∗L .
The focus of our paper is on the case where FH is a mean-preserving
spread of FL: Both distributions FH and FL have the same mean,
CL(1) =
∫ ∞
0
c dFH(c) =
∫ ∞
0
c dFL(c) = CH(1),
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Figure 2: Aggregate cost function
and FL second-order stochastically dominates FH ,∫ c
0
FL(c) dc ≤
∫ c
0
FH(c) dc for all c.
Assumption 2. The two distribution functions cross only once, at some
individual treatment cost denoted cˆ.
Under Assumption 2, we have FH(c) > FL(c) for c < cˆ and FH(c) < FL(c)
for c > cˆ, as shown on Figure 1. It follows that the efficient numbers of
treated patients are no longer ordered as simply as under first-order stochastic
dominance. Specifically, n∗∗L = FL(c
∗∗) is higher than n∗∗H = FH(c
∗∗) if and
only if c∗∗ is larger than cˆ.
Moreover, the provider marginal cost functions are no longer ordered as
in (2). Setting nˆ = FL(cˆ) = FH(cˆ) and using the link between marginal costs
and percentiles, we find C ′H(n) < C
′
L(n) for n < nˆ and C
′
H(n) > C
′
L(n) for
n > nˆ. The cost difference CL(n) − CH(n) increases from zero to CL(nˆ) −
CH(nˆ) as n rises from zero to nˆ, then decreases to zero as n goes to one.
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Figure 2 shows that cost dispersion translates into an efficiency advantage
under rationing by selection. The efficient provider, provider H, is the one
faced with the most dispersed individual treatment costs. When required to
treat a given number of patients, that provider indeed has more freedom of
choice when picking in priority the least costly ones in the population.
The single-crossing property does not hold, but Assumption 2 restricts
the pattern of violation of this assumption, delimitating two different regions:
∂T
∂n
∣∣∣∣
UH
= C ′H(n) < C
′
L(n) =
∂T
∂n
∣∣∣∣
UL
⇐⇒ n < nˆ, (3)
Assumption 2 yields a partitioning of the space of allocations into a positive
single crossing area and a negative single crossing area similar to the one
used by Araujo and Moreira (2010). The resulting single crossing in the cost
difference allows us to sign local distortions in our adverse selection problem.1
Proposition 1. Suppose that FH is a mean-preserving spread of FL and that
Assumption 2 holds.
If c∗∗ > cˆ (c∗∗ < cˆ), the agency has a local incentive to distort the number
of recipients treated by provider L upwards (downwards) from n∗∗L .
Proof. At the efficient allocation (n∗∗H , n
∗∗
L ), the transfers TH and TL that
maximize the welfare are such that the efficient provider earns the informa-
tional rent UH = CL(n
∗∗
L ) − CH(n∗∗L ) > 0 and the inefficient provider earns
UL = 0. The inefficient provider’s incentive constraint can thus be written
as 0 ≥ CL(n∗∗L )− CH(n∗∗L ) + CH(n∗∗H )− CL(n∗∗H ), which is equivalent to∫ nL
nH
[C ′L(n)− C ′H(n)] dn ≤ 0.
Under Assumption 2, the above inequality holds at the efficient allocation
(n∗∗H , n
∗∗
L ), and it is strict when c
∗∗ 6= cˆ. For instance, when c∗∗ > cˆ, we have
n∗∗L > n
∗∗
H > nˆ and C
′
L(n) − C ′H(n) < 0 for n ∈ [n∗∗H , n∗∗L ]. The inefficient
provider’s incentive constraint is therefore satisfied in a neighborhood of the
first-best allocation (n∗∗H , n
∗∗
L ).
Locally, when choosing nL close to n
∗∗
L , the regulator faces a standard
rent versus efficiency tradeoff, choosing nL that maximizes
K(nL) ≡ piLSL(nL)− λpiH [CL(nL)− CH(nL)]. (4)
1In our setup, however, C ′H(n) − C ′L(n) is non-monotonic in n, hence Araujo and
Moreira (2010)’s Assumption A2 does not hold.
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The first derivative of this function at n∗∗L is λpiH [C
′
H(n
∗∗
L ) − C ′L(n∗∗L )], since
SL(n
∗∗
L ) = 0. By (3), it is positive if and only if n
∗∗
L > nˆ.
Heterogeneity is about the dispersion of the marginal cost distribution im-
plies a failure of the Spence-Mirrlees condition. This failure can be exploited
by the agency to reduce the type H informational rent CL(nL)−CH(nL). For
nL close to n
∗∗
L the rent is decreasing in the number of recipients treated by
provider L when n∗∗L > nˆ. The agency then has a local incentive to increase
the number of treated above n∗∗L . Thus, in contrast to the standard result in
the literature, the sign of the local distortion is driven in our setting by the
first-best number of treated recipients: A high number of treated recipients
at the first-best optimum yields a local upward distortion at the second-best
optimum.
Remark. It is known that upward distortions may result from countervailing
incentives arising when the type-dependence of the outside options induces
the inefficient type to mimic the efficient type (see, e.g., Jullien (2000) and
Lewis and Sappington (1989)). This is not the case in our setup where, due
to Assumption 2, the only relevant incentive constraint is that of the efficient
provider. 
The usual single crossing assumption in the cost deals with both local
and global distortions from the first-best optimum. Our single crossing as-
sumption in the cost differences does not ensure that the global optimum
involves treating n∗L < n
∗∗
L recipients in the case where n
∗∗
L is above nˆ. To go
beyond the local results of Proposition 1, we introduce
Assumption 3. The distributions FL and FH are symmetric around cˆ, i.e.
Fi(c) + Fi(2cˆ− c) = 1 for all c and i = H,L.
Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the distributions are equal to one half at the
point where they cross: nˆ = FH(cˆ) = FL(cˆ) = 1/2.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, FH is a mean-
preserving spread of FL, and n
∗∗
L is larger than 1/2. Then the number of
recipients treated by provider L is distorted upwards if SL(1) > SL(1− n∗∗L ).
Proof. Assuming that provider L’s incentive constraint is slack, which we
check later, the second-best number n∗L of recipients treated by that provider
maximizes the function K(n) given by (4). By Assumption 3, the rent
UH(nL) = CL(nL) − CH(nL) is symmetric around its global maximum at
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nˆ = 1/2, i.e., UH(n) = UH(1− n) for all n. We want to show that n∗L > n∗∗L
when n∗∗L > 1/2. The proof proceeds in three steps:
1. Let n˜L = 1 − n∗∗L < 1/2. Since UH(n) = UH(1 − n) and SL increases
below n∗∗L , the maximum of K on [n˜L, n
∗∗
L ] is achieved above 1/2.
2. Since SL is increasing and UH is decreasing on the interval [1/2, n
∗∗
L ],
K is increasing on this interval, implying that the maximum of K on
[n˜L, n
∗∗
L ] is achieved at n
∗∗
L .
3. By symmetry of UH and monotonicity of SL on the intervals [0, n
∗∗
L ]
and [n∗∗L , 1], we have
K(n)−K(1− n) = SL(n)− SL(1− n) ≥ SL(1)− SL(1− n∗∗L ) > 0
for all n ≥ n∗∗L . It follows that the maximum of K(n) on [0, 1] is
achieved at the right of n∗∗L .
By Proposition 1, the maximum is achieved at n∗L strictly above n
∗∗
L . Provi-
der L’s incentive constraint is slack because inequality (3) evaluated at (n∗∗H , n
∗
L)
is strict as n∗L > n
∗∗
L > n
∗∗
H > nˆ and C
′
L < C
′
H on [n
∗∗
H , n
∗
L].
This global result is closely reminiscent of Proposition 1: The number
of recipients is distorted upwards from the first-best optimum if the agency
prefers the inefficient provider (the one faced with less dispersed individual
treatment costs) to treat a sufficiently high number of recipients.
The global condition in Proposition 2 depends on whether treating all
the population is socially preferred to treating only a fraction 1 − n∗∗L . It
should be satisfied in practice: If the first-best optimum recommends to treat
n∗∗L = 80% of the population, the agency should prefer providing universal
coverage to treating only 1− n∗∗L = 20% of the population.2
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